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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE

Cornelius]. Peck*

I

one were to compile a list of much-discussed subjects of
tort law a high ranking would certainly have to be given to
writings on comparative negligence and its relative advantages
and disadvantages as compared with the traditional contributory
negligence rule. There certainly is no dearth of scholarly articles, which explore in detail the origins of the contributory
negligence rule, the extent to which comparative negligence has
been accepted at present, and the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of the two rules.1 Opponents of comparative negligence, frequently insurance counsel, have likewise been productive of articles which generally combine somewhat less impressive scholarly research and theoretical analysis with the observations of men of practical experience.2 Others, some of whom
appear to have an organizational interest in representing claimants, have been quick to reply with arguments which likewise purport to be based upon practical considerations.8
F

•Professor of Law, University of Washington.-Ed.
Professor Z. William Birnbaum, Director of the Statistics Research Laboratory,
University of Washington, has offered helpful suggestions. The National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters and the National Safety Council have also been of great help in
providing statistical data, as the source citations throughout this article indicate. The
author alone, however, is responsible for the somewhat unorthodox and frequently ele•
mentary statistical analysis, as well as the conclusions expressed. - C.J.P.
1 What has properly been called the classic article is Mole and Wilson, "A Study of
Comparative Negligence," 17 CoRN. L. Q. 333, 604 (1932). Other more recent and com•
prehensive treatments of the subject are Maloney, "From Contributory to Comparative
Negligence: A Needed Law Reform," 11 UNIV. FLA. L. R.Ev. 135 (1958); Philbrick, "Loss
Apportionment in Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 572, 766 (1951); Prosser,
"Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 (1953); Turk, "Comparative Negligence
on the March," 28 Cm-KENT L. R.Ev. 189, 304 (1950). An extensive treatment of the subject
may be found in GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936).
A study of relatively recent date devoted to the law of Great Britain, Ireland and the
common law Dominions is WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE (1951).
For a more complete bibliography, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 16-21 (1955). Cf. also James, "Contributory Negligence," 62 YALE L. J.
691 (1953).
2E.g., Benson, "Comparative Negligence-Boon or Bane," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 204 (1956);
Gilmore, "Comparative Negligence from a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance," 10 .ARK. L.
R.Ev. 82 (1955); Harkavy, "Comparative Negligence: The Reflections of a Skeptic," 43
A.B.A.J. 1115 (1957); Lipscomb, "Comparative Negligence," 1951 INS. L. J. 667; Powell,
"Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury," 43 A.B.A.J. 1005
(1957); Varnum, "Comparative Negligence in Automobile Cases," 24 INs. CoUNSEL J. 60
(1957).
3 E.g., Averbach, "Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested
Courts," 19 .ALBANY L. R.Ev. 4 (1955); Bress, "Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken to
the Call of Progress," 43 A.B.A.J. 127 (1957); Eldredge, "Contributory Negligence: An
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As a reference to any of the major studies of comparative negligence will quickly reveal, the doctrine that contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery is now rejected in most of
the common law world and retains its vitality only in this country.4 Even in this country greater recognition has been given to
the principle of comparative negligence, or the proportional sharing of damages, than one inclined to dismiss statutes as exceptions
might at first think. 5 Moreover, either through legislation or judicial invention comparative negligence rules of general applicability, but varying form, prevail in seven states. 6
It would appear that a comparative negligence standard is
favored by the scholars as a workable and more just scheme than
the contributory negligence rule which now prevails in most
states.7 The reasons which appeal to the scholars do not, however,
appear to be convincing to the legislative mind-if one may judge
by the frequency with which proposals for adoption of comparative negligence are made and defeated in state legislatures.8 In
Outmoded Defense That Should Be Abolished," 43 A.B.A.J. 52 (1957); Haines, "Canadian
Comparative Negligence Law," 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 201 (1956); Pound, "Comparative Negligence," 13 NACCA L. J. 195 (1954); Schroeder, "Courts and Comparative Negligence,"
1950 INS. L. J. 791.
4 Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 CoRN. L. Q. 333 at
337-338 (1932); Prosser, "Comparative Negligence,'' 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 at 466 (1953);
Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 CHI-KENT L. R.Ev. 189 at 208-245 (1950).
5 Prosser states that there are some forty statutes, apparently in successful operation,
and that they have been applied in about 1200 cases. Prosser, "Comparative Negligence,"
51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 at 467 (1953).
6 Those states are Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee,
and Wisconsin. The statutes and other authorities in each state are discussed briefly, infra.
7 GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTR.IBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 4 (1936); James,
"Contributory Negligence,'' 62 YALE L. J. 691 at 704-705 (1953); James, "Comparative
Negligence," 26 UTAH BAR. 109 (1956); Malone, "Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's
Forgotten Heritage,'' 6 LA. L. R.Ev. 125 at 142-147 (1945); Maloney, "From Contributory
to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform," 11 UNIV. FLA. L. R.Ev. 135 at 173
(1958); Moruus, TOR.TS 215 (1953); Pound, "Comparative Negligence,'' 13 NACCA L. J.
195 at 197 (1954); Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 at 508 (1953);
Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 572 at 572
(1951); Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March,'' 28 CHI-KENT L. R.Ev. 189 at
341-345 (1950); WILLIAMS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 259 (1951).
Justice Black, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States, had the following
to say about the two rules in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 at 408-409 (1953):
"The harsh rule of the common law under which contributory negligence wholly barred
an injured person from recovery is completely incompatible with modern admiralty policy
and practice. Exercising its traditional discretion, admiralty has developed and now
follows its own fairer and more flexible rule which allows such consideration of contributory negligence in mitigation of damages as justice requires."
8 According to a list compiled in 1951 comparative negligence legislation had been
introduced in the following fifteen states, all of which have rejected the proposals:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
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the absence of effective rebuttal of the scholarly view, the conviction grows that the persuasive arguments against comparative
negligence are found, not in a supposed justice of denying recovery to one whose negligence contributed to his injuries, but
in practical considerations of effect of adoption of such a rule.
Such practical considerations include concern for the frequency
with which claims would be made, the frequency with which
juries would deal kindly with an injured party at the expense of
a relatively innocent but financially responsible defendant, the
effect of such verdicts upon negotiated settlements, the difficulties
and expense of disposing of frivolous or nuisance claims, and the
burden upon the courts resulting from litigation under a scheme
making recoveries possible which would at the present time be
barred by contributory negligence.9
The purpose of this article is not to re-plow the ground of
history, case law, and statutory developments which has been so
competently tilled by others. Nor is the purpose to give a detailed consideration of each of the practical matters mentioned
above.10 Instead, the focus of this article is on the relationship
between comparative negligence and automobile liability insurance. Insurance rates and accident statistics, rather than rules of
law and cases, are the primary materials. Such a consideration
of the subject it might be hoped would give a positive and substantiated answer to the frequently debated but never documented
question of whether adoption of comparative negligence would
result in an increase in automobile liability insurance premium
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and ·washington. Lipscomb,
"Comparative Negligence," 1951 INS. L.J. 667 at 674. Subsequent efforts to enact such
legislation have failed in Alabama, 8 ALA. L. REV. 71 (1955); Florida, Maloney, "From
Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform," 11 UNIV. FLA. L. R.Ev.
135 at 136, n. 5 (1958); New York, Averbach, "Comparative Negligence Legislation: A
Cure for Our Congested Courts," 19 ALBANY L. REV. 4 at 13 (1955); Note, 25 FORD. L. REV.
184, notes 5,6,7 (1956); Pennsylvania, O'Toole, "Comparative Negligence: The Pennsylvania Proposal," 2 VII.L. L. R.Ev. 474 (1957); and Washington, House Bill No. 28, 32d reg.
sess., 1951; Senate Bill No. 352, 33d reg. sess., 1953; House Bill No. 40, Senate Bill No. 460,
35th reg. sess., 1957.
See authorities cited, note 2 supra.
recently published report of a survey of Arkansas judges and lawyers on the
effects of that state's adoption of comparative negligence in 1955 furnishes much valuable
information with respect to many of these problems. Rosenberg, "Comparative Negligence
in Arkansas: A 'Before and After' Survey," 13 ARK. L. R.Ev. 89 (1959). Another recent
study of related problems is ZEISEL, KALVEN, AND BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS (1959).
Of particular interest for the purposes of this article is the author's conclusion that the
phenomenon of claims consciousness does exist. Their discussion of the subject appears
in chapter 20 of the book.
9

10 A

692

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

rates.11 As will appear, however, such precision does not seem
to be possible. Nevertheless it does appear possible to draw some
meaningful conclusions about the limits within or extent to which
comparative negligence does affect premium rates, if indeed it
has any effect. The insurance statistics also contain information
with respect to the effect of comparative negligence in stimulating
the filing of claims and the size of claim settlements. Further observations may be made with respect to the frequently expressed
view that even in states in which the contributory negligence
rule prevails comparative negligence is in fact practiced by all
concerned, including adjusters, attorneys, juries, and even judges. In this way it is hoped something will be added to the information available for evaluation of the practical considerations
which appear to control the decision to adopt or reject a comparative negligence standard in lieu of the contributory negligence
rule.
OBSTACLES TO DETERMINING THE EFFECTS
OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE ON LIABILITY INSURANCE

As with discussions about the weather, many people have talked
about the possible effect of comparative negligence on liability
insurance premium rates, but nobody has done anything to
demonstrate that effect. To some it appears to be so obvious
that comparative negligence would increase the rates that no
evidentiary data is advanced to support the proposition. Others,
premising their conclusion on the assumption that comparative
negligence is the true test applied in almost every case, are equally certain that comparative negligence has no effect on liability
insurance rates. One skeptical view finds significance in the fact
that insurance counsel, who have available to them the necessary
data, have failed to produce statistical support for the proposition that rates are increased.12 Another author does state that a
IO-year study indicates that automobile liability rates in Wisconsin, where a form of comparative negligence prevails, exceed the rates for comparable cities and areas in surrounding
11 E.g., Averbach, "Comparative Negligence Legislation: A Cure for Our Congested
Courts," 19 ALBANY L. REv. 4 at 11 (1955); Bress, "Comparative Negligence,'' 43 A.B.A.J.
127 at 129 (1957); Grubb and Roper, "Comparative Negligence," 32 NEB. L. R.Ev. 234 at
246-247 (1952); Hayes, "New York Should Adopt a Comparative Negligence Rule," 27
N.Y.S. BUL. 288 at 289 (1955); Harkavy, "Comparative Negligence," 43 A.B.A.J. 115 at
116 (1957); Pound, "Comparative Negligence," 13 NACCA L.J. 195 at 198-199 (1954);
note, 30 N.D. L. REv. 105 at 117 (1954).
12 Maloney, "Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform,'' 11 UNIV. FLA. L.
REv. 135 at 163 (1958).
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states by 17 to 64 percent.13 The inference, however, that this
variance is caused by comparative negligence alone would seem
to be destroyed by the improbability that a single cause would
have such diverse effects. Meanwhile, no one seems sufficiently
concerned to enter upon speculation as to whether comparative
negligence, which would permit insurers to maintain subrogation actions otherwise barred by the insured's negligence, would
result in decreased rates for insurance against loss by collision.14
Perhaps, despite the attempt made here, the explanation of this
inactivity is that, as is the case with the weather, nothing can be
done about it.
Safety Factors

Certainly the obstacles to detecting an effect of a rule of law
upon insurance rates are both numerous and imposing. Obviously, one may not simply compare the rates of a state with a
form of comparative negligence with the rates of a neighboring
state in which the contributory negligence rule prevails, and conclude that any difference in rates is attributable to the legal effect
given to negligence on the part of the injured party. There are
almost certain to be differences in safety conditions in the two
states, and as might be expected and can be demonstrated, safety
conditions and the accident rate play a much more important
part in determining the level of insurance rates than do differences
in this rule of law. Safety conditions within a state in turn depend upon many variables, such as the physical condition of
streets and highways, the degree to which principles of safety
engineering have been incorporated in construction, the traffic
13 Grubb and Roper, "Comparative Negligence," 32 NEB. L. REv. 234 at 246-247 (1952).
14 As pointed out infra, one of the difficulties of comparing insurance rates in different

states is that the rates become effective in different states upon different dates. While
adjustment can be made with respect to liability insurance on the basis of a monthly
change factor to reduce the rates to a common date, the addition of the variables of the
number of automobile models, the changing automobile styles of the models, and the
declining values of autos with age and obsolescence makes similar adjustments with
collision insurance seem unreal.
A sample check of the rates published by National Auto Undenvriters Association
for $50.00 deductible collision insurance on a Chevrolet 6-cylinder 4-door Bel Air sedan,
and in effect September 1959, did show that Wisconsin rates for the remainder of state
territory were lower than the rates in Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota though higher
than the rates for Iowa. Mississippi's comparable rates were lower than those applicable
in its neighboring states. On the other hand, the Arkansas rates for the remainder of
state territory were higher than those applicable in Missouri, Oklahoma, and Mississippi,
but lower than those applicable in Louisiana and Tennessee. The Georgia rates applicable
were also higher than those applicable in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and South
Carolina, but lower than those applicable in Tennessee.
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volume, the distribution of the traffic between rural and urban
driving, the weather conditions which prevail, the level of driver
education and the degree to which safety-mindedness has been
impressed upon the driving population, the traffic laws, such as
speed limits, the minimum age for drivers' licenses, the tests administered upon granting and renewal of licenses, and even the
liquor laws and licensing policies, as well as the effectiveness
with which traffic laws are enforced.111

Economic Variables
Another cluster of factors affecting insurance rates may be
characterized as economic. Tremendous differences may exist in
the economies of neighboring states. For example, the 1956 per
capita income in Mississippi, a comparative negligence state, was
$964, whereas the 1956 per capita income in the neighboring
state of Louisiana was $1,444.16 Manufacturers' payrolls are almost double farm income in Wisconsin, whereas in adjoining
Iowa farm income is more than triple the total of manufacturers'
payrolls.17 These differences in economic level and type of activity are reflected in the damages awarded for loss of earnings.
They also affect jury estimates of the value to be assigned pain
and suffering or the loss of a limb. Economic factors have a secondary effect through their direct effect on highway construction, repair, and the type and density of traffic. Finally, the
effectiveness of governmental regulation of the insurance industry and the rates which it charges varies greatly from state to
state. Thus, rates of a state which are higher in relation to the
frequency of accidents and the economic level than those of another state may reflect an insurance commission's acceptance of
lower permissible loss ratios, or higher insurance industry profits.

Legal Factors
Turning to legal considerations, it is also obvious that differences in other rules of law may be equally significant in determining the level of insurance rates. For example, in Wisconsin
15 For a discussion of the numerous causes of traffic accidents, see DESILVA, WHY WE
HAVE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1942). The National Safety Council's annual publication,
Accident Facts, contains much statistical information about traffic accidents. For assistance
in interpretation of such statistics, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM 'TRAFFIC ACCIDENT STATISTICS, UsES OF 'TRAFFIC ACCIDENT RECORDS (1947).
16 THE WORLD ALMANAC -1958, p. 752.
17Id., pp. 657,688.
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a statute allows the joinder of the insurance company concerned
as a defendant in the action brought against the alleged tortfeasor.18
The general rule is that prejudicial error may be committed by
the intentional injection of evidence showing the defendant carries
liability insurance because of its tendency to induce larger verdicts.19 If there is any factual basis for this rule, the Wisconsin
joinder statute must be assigned considerable responsibility for
any excess of Wisconsin rates over those of its neighbors attributable to legal rules.
Other legal factors which might affect insurance rates include
the presence or absence of a "guest statute," requiring proof of
gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional wrongdoing, or
satisfaction of some other difficult test as a basis for imposing
liability to a gratuitous passenger in an automobile. 20 It is conceivable that rates would be affected by the acceptance of the family
car doctrine, or a statutory basis21 for imposing liability on the
owner of an automobile for injuries inflicted by others using the
vehicle. Statutory violations, particularly violations of traffic laws,
receive varying treatment in different jurisdictions, constituting
negligence per se in some states and only evidence of negligence
in others.22 These differences might be expected to affect insurance
rates, as would differences in the degree to which the presence of
contributory negligence is determined by the same standards used
18 Wis. Stat. (1957) §§85.93, 260.11 (1). See MacDonald, "Direct Action Against Liability
Insurance Companies," 1957 Wis. L. R.:Ev. 612.
19 4 A.L.R. (2d) 764 at 765 (1949). The Wisconsin court appears to have little doubt
that the joinder statute has increased recoveries in that state. In Bergstein v. Popkin, 202
Wis. 625 at 633, 233 N.W. 572 (1930), the court said: "Whether or not it is an indictment
of our jury system, it is a fact recognized by everyone that the purpose of making the
insurance company a party defendant is to increase the award of damages made against
the insured. That it has that effect, no one familiar with the trial of cases can doubt."
20 Wisconsin, for example, has no host-guest statute, which might be expected to
contribute to higher rates. However, one authoritative view is that the net effect of such
statutes on recoveries by guests as a class is not materially different from that which obtains
under the common law rules developed in Wisconsin. Campbell, "Host-Guest Rules in
Wisconsin," 1943 WIS. L. R.Ev. 180 at 203.
Neither Georgia nor Mississippi, both states with comparative negligence rules and
the subject of detailed investigation, infra, have host-guest statutes. Arkansas, another
state with a comparative negligence statute, does have a statute requiring the proof of
willful and wanton operation. Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §75.913. For a listing of state
statutes and a discussion of the host-guest liability problem, see 2 HARPER AND JAMES,
TORTS 950-962 (1956).
21 See 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1419-1428 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 369-372
(1955).
22 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 997 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 152-164 (1955). For
an interesting attempt to compare the difficulties of recovery presented by varying treatments of contributory negligence in Wisconsin and the four states surrounding it, see
comment, 1954 WIS. L. R.Ev. 95.

696

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

to determine what constitutes negligence on the part of the defendant.23 Varying forms of the last clear chance doctrine produce
disparity of treatment of contributory negligence in different
states,24 and thus permit a range for differences in the operative
effects of comparative and contributory negligence in comparisons
between various states. Moreover, as will be seen, considerable
variation exists in the formulation of the comparative negligence
rules of the various states, again destroying any expectation that
a fixed or quantitative difference exists when so-called comparative
negligence state rates are compared with rates of states enforcing
a contributory negligence rule. For example, recognition of
assumption of the risk as a complete defense may make less distinct
the differences between a contributory negligence ru~e and a comparative negligence rule. 25

The Existing Data
The difficulty of sorting out and identifying the effect of any
one of these many variables affecting rates is made even more difficult, or perhaps impossible, by the deficiencies and inadequacies of
existing statistical and rate data. Of course, the existing data were
not accumulated for the purpose of detecting an effect due to the
different legal consequences of contributory negligence. Accordingly, it is necessary to mine, stamp, and refine the existing raw
materials in order to extract any information on the subject.
There is, for example, no single liability rate for a particular
state. The number of insurance companies engaged in the casualty
insurance business in each state is an assurance of diversity within
the limits established by competition. To a considerable extent
this difficulty is overcome by the rate formulation services performed by associations of casualty insurance companies, such as
Cf. James, "Contributory Negligence," 62 YALE L.J. 691 at 723-729 (1953).
242 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1245-1255 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 290-296 (1955).
A view that the version of last clear chance known as the ''humanitarian doctrine," and
applied in Missouri to defendants operating motor vehicles [HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS
1252-1253 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 294-295 (1955)], is productive of higher liability
insurance rates than comparative negligence finds some support in comparison of the
insurance rates applicable in Missouri and Arkansas. See Tables IV-A and V.
25 Insofar as assumption of the risk is merely another way of stating that there· is
no liability in the absence of a duty, recognition of the defense under a comparative
negligence system would seem to be of little importance. But conduct which might be
more properly characterized as contributory negligence is sometimes recognized as a
defense under the label of assumption of the risk. E.g., Southland Butane Gas Co. v.
Blackwell, 211 Ga. 665, 88 S.E. (2d) 6 (1955). Cf. Storlie v. Hartford Accident 8: Indemnity Co., 251 Wis. 340, 28 N.W. (2d) (1947); Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 S. (2<!1)
646 (1947).
23
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the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. On the basis of
the losses reported to these associations actuarial determinations
are made of the rates which should be charged for various categories
of risks in the various states. This information is furnished to
members and sold to other companies which wish to purchase the
services of the associations. The National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters also serves as an agent for its members, filing new
rates with the various state insurance commissions for approval.
Departures from these rates for competitive purposes may be and
are made by those non-member companies which merely purchase
the rate determination services of the bureau. Other companies
arrive at a rate structure in various independent ways.
Of course, even what uniformity is obtained through acceptance
of the rate structure of a particular association does not permit
free comparison of the rates of one state with rates of another
state. The National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters has, for
example, divided each state into a number of rate territories for
the purpose of accumulating loss statistics and for fixing of rates.
Several territories in a particular state may be combined in a single
territorial grouping with a single rate structure for all territories
within that grouping, pending accumulation- of sufficient experience to permit more refined treatrµent of each territory. Determination of what area shall be encompassed in a territory or a
territorial grouping depends upon a number of variable factors.
Without uniformity in definition, territories in different states
may be compared only with extreme difficulty. For most of the
states the bureau has established one catch-all territory, denominated "remainder of the state," which includes all the areas which
did not have sufficiently distinctive characteristics to merit treatment as a separate territory. It is this territorial rate structure
which appears to offer the greatest opportunity for comparison,
since it generally covers rural and small city areas, where the
differences between territories in the accident rate caused by
density of population, volume of traffic, and varying degrees of
vigilance in municipal law enforcement are minimized. It is,
however, far from an ideal unit for comparison.
In addition to the possibilities of classifying insurance by
breadth of coverage in monetary terms, the risks insured may be
classified in a number of other ways. One bureau classification of
private automobiles, Class I-A, covers individually-owned vehicles,
driven for pleasure and not used for business or for transportation
to or from work, and not owned or driven by a male under the
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age of 25. Another classification covers similarly-described vehicles,
except that transportation to and from work not in excess of ten
miles in each direction is allowed. Other classifications of privatelyowned vehicles exist, of course, and commercial vehicles are subject
to many classifications based upon the type of vehicle and its use.
Of course, even standard policies are subject to varying constructions in different states. The effect of this diversity of classification
with respect to privately-owned au,tomobiles is, however, greatly
minimized by the use of a rate for a particular classification as the
base rate, with the rates for other classifications computed as fixed
percentages of the base rate. For example, in most states Class I-A
is the base rate for the privately-owned automobile, and the rates
for other risk classifications of privately-owned vehicles are computed as fixed percentages of that rate.26
Comparison of the rates effective in different states is further
complicated by the fact that there is no uniformity between states
in the dates upon which filings of rates take place. For example,
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters filed the Class I-A
rate, now effective in Oklahoma, on October 23, 1957, whereas
the rate for the same classification in Arkansas was filed on December 19, 1958. In light of the general inflationary trend, direct
comparison of these rates would be misleading. Some correction
for the differences in dates of filing can be made, as has been done
in the computations made herein, by determining a monthly rate
of increase or decrease between two filing dates, and using that
monthly_rate figure to reduce the rates of all states to a hypothetical
common filing date.
Differences in insurance rates exist, of course, not only because
of the claim consciousness of the population of a state but also
because of the difference in safety conditions in various states and
the frequency with which insured vehicles are involved in accidents. Before comparison of rates may be made for the purpose
of determining whether comparative negligence has an effect on
the rates, proper adjustment must be made for the difference in
the rates caused by a higher or lower accident rate. However,
26 The rate structure in the commercial classification of the bureau no longer follows
this pattern. Within the privately-owned automobile classification, the additional premiums for categories of increased risks are determined as a fixed percentage of the Class I-A
rate. A different set of percentage ratios are used for determining the increased premium
applicable in large cities than is used with small cities and rural areas. Two sets of
percentage ratios for these two types of territories have been established on a countrywide basis. However, there are variations in a number of states.
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the available statistical data on non-fatal accidents and injuries
which might be used to make such an adjustment is far from
satisfactory. Although there exist uniform definitions of motor
vehicle accidents, 27 these definitions are not used by all accident
reporting authorities, and it appears that the definitions are not
applied in the same manner by those authorities which do use
them. For example, during the year 1957 the ratio of reported
injuries to reported deaths varied from six injuries to one death
in Arkansas to 241 injuries to one death in Massachusetts.28 Such
variation exists, not because of true differences in the ratios, but
because of what injuries are counted.
Death, of course, has a uniformity and importance which does
give reliability to death statistics. Upon appraisal of the relative
reliability of the reports available, the National Safety Council
has adopted a uniform ratio of thirty-five disabling injuries for
each death for estimating the number of disabling injuries for
each state.29 While such an estimate is undoubtedly more reliable
than the available reported information, it obviously rests upon
an assumption which is incorrect. Other statistics indicate that,
even after allowance for poorer reporting in rural areas, the ratio
of injuries to fatalities is much higher in urban regions than in
rural areas, probably because the higher rate of speed in rural
accidents is more likely to produce a fatality than is the case in
an urban accident.30 Since the relative distribution of the population in urban and rural regions varies greatly in the various
states, it must be acknowledged that even the best indicator of
safety conditions in the various states-that found in death statistics
-is inaccurate.
Finally, the available statistics are frequently presented in a
form which renders extremely hazardous their manipulation by
persons unskilled in statistical methods. That description is unfortunately appropriate for most members of the legal profession
who are concerned with the subject. Chance and fortuitous combinations produce distortions, particularly in statistical analysis
involving small samples and fields; and with the limited number
27 U.S. DEPT. OF HEA!.TII, EDUCATION AND "WELFARE, UNIFORM DEFINmONS OF MOTOR
VEHICLE ACCIDENTS, 2d rev. (1953).
28 TRAFFIC SA.FEIT, p. 34 (December 1957).
29 Letter from the National Safety Council, March 26, 1958.
30 DESILVA, WHY WE HAVE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS 120 (1942); NATIONAL SAFEI'Y
COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS-1957, 50, 55.
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of states in the country as well as the small number of states with
comparative negligence the risk of distortion here is high. Statistics
themselves prove nothing; a cause and effect relationship must
be read into them. And one who has a priori knowledge of the
cause and effect probably can :find at least some statistics which
demonstrate what he already knew.31
The lawyer unskilled in statistics may take encouragement
from the statement of the National Conference on Uniform Traffic
Accident Statistics that experience has shown that relatively advanced statistical techniques are not normally necessary or practical
in traffic accident analysis work. 32 But, having surveyed the difficulties presented by the multitude of operative factors and the
inadequacy of the data available, he will abandon hope that effect
of comparative negligence can be shown with an accuracy expressible in fixed percentages or many figured decimal ratios. He
may even agree with one eminent scholar that the windfall to
plaintiffs caused by retention of the last clear chance doctrine in
states with comparative negligence rules must be reflected in insurance rates. 33 But he will feel sure that no instrument now
exists whjch can measure that consequence.
THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATES

As mentioned above, comparative negligence exists in many
states in the form of statutes of limited application, and, indeed,
it may be found throughout the nation in litigation under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. However, only seven states
have comparative negligence rules of general applicability which
31 E.g., Powell, "Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury,"
43 A.B.A.J. 1005 at 1007 (1957), cites statistics indicating that even under contributory
negligence rules 85% to 90% of all claims asserted are settled, but distinguishes the
comparable statistics of litigation under the comparative negligence rule of the Federal
Employers Liability Act, in which 87 % of the claims are reported to be settled by
compromise prior to verdict, on the basis that in such cases only one claimant out of
each thousand fails to obtain compensation. On the other band, statistics reported in
ZEISEL, KAI.VEN, AND BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURTS 40 (1959), indicate that in New
York city only l.'7% of all personal injury claims are tried to completion. Assuming even
a 50% victory rate for plaintiffs, the total result in proportion of claimants receiving
compensation would appear to be little different from that indicated in the statistics
cited by Powell.
Or, for another example, see the suggestion, infra note 72, of a possible use of
statistics to support a conclusion that comparative negligence encourages bad driving
habits and accidents.
32 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON UNIFORM ACCIDENT STATISTICS, USES OF °TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
RECORDS 153 (1947).
33 Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 at 496 (1953).

1960]

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE

701

might be expected to affect automobile liability insurance rates.
The comparative negligence rules of even these seven states are
far from uniform, and a brief summary of their differences seems
a necessary basis for evaluation of statistical data.

Georgia
Detailed consideration of the comparative negligence rule of
Georgia may be found in any of the major articles on the subject
of comparative negligence.34 The rule appears to have originated
in a series of common law decisions in actions against railroads
in which the Georgia court drew on a few contemporary English
decisions as authority for the proposition that fault on the part of
the plaintiff should go to mitigation of the damages. The codifiers
of the Georgia Code of 1860-1862 restated and incorporated the
principle of these cases, as they were authorized to do, in that
code.35 Although the present code language36 would appear to
limit application of the principle to cases involving railroad defendants, this in fact has not been the case, and the principle is
one of general applicability. However, one who judges comparative negligence rules with the standards of a purist will find some
defects in the Georgia rule. It applies only where the fault of
the plaintiff is less than that of the defendant, producing a mitigation of damages in proportion to the fault attributable to the
plaintiff. The bar to recovery still exists where plaintiff's fault
is equal to or greater than that of the defendant. Moreover,
another statutory provision31 has been applied in connection with
34 Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 CoRN. L. Q. 604 at
635-637 (1932); Maloney, "From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law
Reform," 11 UNIV. FLA. L. R.Ev. 135 at 156-157 (1958); Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in
Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 766 at 777-780 (1951); Prosser, "Comparative
Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 at 489-490, 497 (1953); Turk, "Comparative Negligence
on the March," 28 CHI-KENT L. R.Ev. 304 at 326-333 (1950).
35 The better discussions of this development are found in Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 766 (1951) and Turk, "Comparative
Negligence on the March," 28 CHI-KENT L. R.Ev. 304 (1950).
36 Ga. Code Ann. (1935) §94-703: "Consent or negligence of person injured as defense:
comparative negligence as affecting the amount of recovery- No person shall recover
damages from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property, where the same
is done by his consent or is caused by his own negligence. If the complainant and the
agents of the company are both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall
be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to him."
31 Ga. Code Ann. (1935) §105-603: "If the plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided
the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence, he is not entitled to
recover. In other cases the defendant is not relieved, although the plaintiff may in some
way have contributed to the injury sustained."
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the comparative negligence rule so as to create what has appropriately been called a reverse last clear chance doctrine38 which
completely bars recovery if the plaintiff could have avoided the
consequences of defendant's negligence by the exercise of ordinary
care. This provision has been applied rigorously by the Georgia
courts,39 and would bar recovery even in a case in which the
defendant was guilty of gross negligence.40 It also appears that
it may be utilized to give complete effect to contributory negligence as a bar in the guise of assumption of the risk. 41 Nevertheless,
the consensus appears to be that the Georgia rule represents one
of the more comprehensive forms of comparative negligence.

Mississippi
The first comparative negligence statute of general applicability in this country was enacted in Mississippi in 1910.42 As
might be expected the statute and case law have been the subject
of extensive comment in the various writings on comparative
negligence.43 The statute creates what might be called true comparative negligence in that it rejects the requirement found in
Georgia law, that the plaintiff's negligence be less than that of
the defendant. Under this statute it is conceivable that one whose
negligence constituted 80 or 90 percent of the fault causing his
injuries could recover 10 or 20 percent of his damages from the
defendant. Likewise, the statute permits recovery by one who
was guilty of "gross negligence," provided that a proportional
ss Prosser, "Comparative Negligence,'' 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 at 497 (1953). Cf. Maloney,
"From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform,'' 11 UNIV. FLA.
L. REv. 135 at 156 (1958); Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases,'' 99 UNIV.
PA. L. R.Ev. 766 at 778 (1951).
so Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 135, 97 S.E. (2d) 149 (1957); Brown
v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 96 Ga. App. 771, IOI S.E. (2d) 603 (1957).
40 Oast v. Mopper, 58 Ga. App. 506, 199 S.E. 249 (1938).
41 Southland Butane Gas Co. v. Blackwell, 2ll Ga. 665, 88 S.E. (2d) 6 (1955).
42 Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §1454: "In all actions hereafter brought for personal
injuries, or where such injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact
that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having control over the
property may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but
damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the, property, or the person having
control over the property."
§1455: "All Questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the
jury to determine."
43 Mole and Wilson, "Comparative Negligence,'' 17 CoRN. L. Q. 604 at 640-643 (1932);
Philbrick, "Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 766 at 795
(1951); Shell and Bufkin, "Comparative Negligence in Mississippi,'' 27 MISS. L. J. 105
(1956); note, 17 TEMP. L. Q. 276 at 283-285 (1943); GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION
IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 57-59 (1936).
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reduction in the damages awarded is made.44 Assumption of the
risk constitutes a bar to recovery.45 Nevertheless, the Mississippi
rule presents comparative negligence in its purest and most comprehensive form, making that state's rule a desirable subject of
investigation for present purposes.

Wisconsin
The comparative negligence law of Wisconsin is likewise based
upon a statute,46 and has been the subject of extensive comment
in writings on comparative negligence. 47 The law, enacted in
1931, resembles that of Georgia in that recovery is allowed only
in cases in which the plaintiff's negligence is not as great as that
of the defendant. In such cases damages are reduced in the proportion which plaintiff's negligence bears to the total negligence
involved in producing his injuries.48 Assumption of the risk is
recognized as a complete defense, but the statute does not require
diminution of the damages where the defendant has been guilty
of gross negligence.49 Like the Georgia and Mississippi rules,
the Wisconsin law appears to be a desirable subject of investigation.

Arkansas
The most recent adoption of a comparative negligence rule of
general applicability occurred in Arkansas in 1955.150 Based upon
a draft prepared by Dean Prosser,51 the 1955 act followed the
44 Mole and Wilson, "Comparative Negligence," 17 CoRN. L.Q. 604 at 641 (1932);
Shell and Bufkin, "Comparative Negligence in Mississippi," Zl MISS. L.J. 105 at ll2-ll3
(1956).
45 Shell and Bufkin, "Comparative Negligence in Mississippi," 27 MISS. L. J. 105 at
108-109 (1956).
46 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) §331.045: "Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in
an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great
as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering."
47 Campbell, "Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Law," 7 Wis. L. REv. 222 (1932);
Campbell, "Ten Years of Comparative Negligence," 1941 WIS. L. R.Ev. 289; K.noeller,
"Review of the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act," 41 MARQ. L. R.Ev. 397 (1958);
Padway, "Comparative Negligence," 16 MARQ. L. REv. 3 (1931); Prosser, "Comparative
Negligence," 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 at 490-494 (1953); Whelan, "Comparative Negligence"
1938 WIS. L. REv. 465; GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
63-67 (1936).
48 Campbell, "Ten Years of Comparative Negligence," 1941 WIS. L. R.Ev. 289 at 291-292.
49 Id. at 297-301.
150 Ark. Acts 1955, No. 199.
51 Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 M1CH. L. REv. 465 at 508 (1953).
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pure .comparative negligence principle of the Mississippi law and
allowed recovery regardless of whether or not the plaintiff's negligence exceeded that of the defendant. Two years later, the legislature found that there was lack of understanding and uniformity
in the application of the 1955 act and that with the law in its then-.
existing state, great confusion and unfairness occurred in the trial
of negligence cases. Accordingly, the statute was repealed.52 However, Arkansas did not return to a contributory negligence rule,
for the repealing statute enacted in place of the 1955 act the more
limited version of comparative negligence which prevails in
Georgia and Wisconsin. And so since 1957 recovery has been
allowed in Arkansas only where the plaintiff's negligence is "of
less degree" than the negligence of the person causing the injuries.53
The short time since adoption of comparative negligence in
Arkansas, as well as a possible unsettling effect from the 1957
change of the law, might be considered to render the state's insurance situation an unsuitable subject of investigation. Whatever
defects as a subject might be caused by uncertainties about whether
the full effect of the change has yet been experienced would seem
to be more than offset by the unique opportunity afforded to
analyze the changes which occur within a state which does adopt
comparative negligence. One very valuable study, based on the
responses to a survey of Arkansas judges and lawyers with extensive
experience in personal injury litigation, has led its author to conclude that introduction of comparative negligence in Arkansas
brought perceptible changes to the course of personal injury litigation, but did not drastically alter the size or quality of the courts'
52 Ark. Acts 1957, No. 296. The reasons for the repeal are said to be dissatisfaction
with a rule permitting recovery by one as much as 90% at fault as well as the confusion
about the proper handling of cases involving set-off of counterclaims by insured parties.
Note, 11 Arut. L. R.Ev. 391 at 392 (1957). For a discussion of the latter problem, see Leflar
and Wolfe, "Must the Insurer Reimburse the Insured for His Personal Loss Credited
Against the Judgment?" 11 Arut. L. R.Ev. 71 (1956).
53 Ark. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1959) §27-1730.1: "Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery of damages for any injury, property damage or death where the negligence of
the person injured or killed is of less degree than the negligence of any person, firm, or
corporation causing such damage."
§27-1730.2: "In all actions hereafter accruing for negligence resulting in personal
injuries or wrongful death or injury to property, the contributory negligence shall not
prevent a recovery where any negligence of the person so injured, damaged, or killed is
of less degree than any negligence of any person, firm, or corporation causing such
damage; provided that where such contributory negligence is shown on the part of the
person injured, damaged or killed, the amount of the recovery shall be diminished in
proportion to such contributory negligence."
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burdens in processing cases.64 Against a background of such conclusions, study of changes in automobile liability insurance in
Arkansas may be particularly informative.

Tennessee
The courts of Tennessee early developed a comparative negligence rule of general applicability but limited scope.56 In that
state plaintiff's contributory negligence which is a proximate cause
of his injuries bars recovery, but remote contributory negligence
of the plaintiff is considered only for the purposes of mitigating
damages. The supreme court of the state has expressly repudiated
the doctrine of comparative negligence,66 and, as Dean Prosser
has noted, in practical operation the Tennessee rule has resulted
in apportionment only in cases in which the defendant had the
last clear chance.67 Viewed in this light, there is no greater expectation that so-called comparative negligence rule of Tennessee
will be reflected in automobile liability insurance statistics than
would be the case for any of the other variations of the last clear
chance rule. Considering the obstacles mentioned above, that
expectation must be regarded as an insubstantial possibility.

Nebraska and South Dakota
The comparative negligence rules of Nebraska and South
Dakota are both statutory, that of South Dakota being a 1941
copy6 8 of a law adopted in Nebraska in 1913.59 The statute pro54 Rosenberg, "Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A 'Before and After' Survey,"
13 ARK. L. REv. 89 at 108 (1959).
55 Mole and Wilson, "A Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 CORN. L.Q. 604 at 611613 (1932); Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 at 485-486, 496-497
(1953); Turk, "Comparative Negligence on the March," 28 CHI-KENT L. REv. 304 at 313317 (1950).
56 East Tennessee, V. &: G. Ry. Co. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33, 12 S.W. 419 (1889). Cf. Atlantic
Coastline R. Co. v. Smith, (6th Cir. 1959) 264 F. (2d) 428 at 432.
57Prosser, "Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 at 497 (1953).
68 S.D. Code (Supp. 1952) §47.0304-1.
59 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1956) §25-1151. The language of both the Nebraska and South
Dakota statutes is as follows:
"In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his property
caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation
of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the
plaintiff; and all questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the
jury."
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vides that contributory negligence shall not bar recovery when
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the
negligence of the defendant was gross in comparfaon. In such
cases the jury is to consider the contributory negligence in mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of the contributory
negligence. As reference to the discussions60 of the Nebraska and
South Dakota statutes will soon reveal, incorporation of the treacherous words, "slight" and "gross" has been productive of considerable litigation which has failed to produce certainty. While
statements of the Nebraska court made in contexts in which direct
consideration of the problem was not required indicate that ratios
of one to four 61 or one to six62 might comply with the requirement
that plaintiff's negligence be slight, the concensus of the writers,63
which is confirmed by the cases, 64 is that essentially these states
have retained the doctrine of contributory negligence. This being
so, these states, like Tennessee, do not provide workable opportunities for learning whether or not comparative negligence has an
effect upon automobile liability insurance.
They do, however, furnish an example of the difficulty of
explaining a variation in rates in states which have the same rule
gove~ing contributory negligence and also have a comparable
climate and economy. Thus, Table I presents some basic data
concerning these states and their immediate neighbors to the north
and south. While it comes as no surprise that the premium rate
for the remainder of the state territory is not the same for the two
states, South Dakota's lower rate is not what would be expected
in light of the fact that that state has a considerably higher rate
of deaths per registered automobile than does Nebraska. One
might attempt to explain the higher premium rate in Nebraska
on the basis of the higher per capita income and the higher proportion of urban dwellers in that state, pointing out that these
60 Baylor, "Comparative Negligence in Nebraska," 10 S. D. B. J. 146 (1941); Grubb and
Roper, "Comparative Negligence," 32 NEB. L. R.Ev. 234 (1952); Mole and Wilson, "A
Study of Comparative Negligence," 17 CoRN. L. Q. 604 at 637-639 (1932); Philbrick, "Loss
Apportionment in Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 766 at 793-795 (1951); Prosser,
"Comparative Negligence," 51 MICH. L. REv. 465 at 486-489 (1953); note, 17 NEB. L. BUL.
68 (1938); GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcnoNS 61-63 (1936).
61 Sgroi v. Yellow Cab and Baggage Co., 124 Neb. 525, 247 N.W. 355 (1933).
62Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73,254 N.W. 704 (1934).
63 GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE AcnONS 61 (1936); Philbrick,
"Loss Apportionment in Negligence Cases," 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 766 at 794 (1951);
Prosser, "Comparative Negligence,'' 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 465 at 487 (1953).
64Allen v. Kavanaugh, 160 Neb. 645, 71 N.W. (2d) 119 (19,55); Pleinis v. Wilson
Storage and Transfer Co., 75 S.D. 397, 66 N.W. (2d) 68 (1954); Friese v. Gulbrandson,
69 S.D. 179, 8 N.W. (2d) 438 (1943).
I
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TABLE I
NEBRASKA-SOUTH DAKOTA COMPARISON

State

Class I-A 1
Premium
Rate

Policy
Claim•
Frequency

Deaths Per•
Reg. Auto
1954-1956

Per Capita•
Income
1956

Urban-•
Rural Ratio
1950

Nebraska •••••••••••••••
South Dakota •••••••••••
North Dakota •••••••••••
Kansas •••••••••••••••••

$23.00
21.00
25.00
29.00

14
10
10
15

1.91
2.46
2.22
2.38

$1588.
1330.
1365.
1668.

.88

.so

.37
1.09

• Remainder of the State Premium adjusted as of January 31. 1958, for Class I-A Bodily Injury and Property
Damage Coverage within limits of $5,000 per claim and $10,000 per accident for bodily injury and $5,000
per accident for property damage--Rates of National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.
• Number of personal injury claims incurred per 100 automobiles insured on a statewide basis during 19541956. Letter dated November 5, 1958, from the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.
• Traffic deaths during 1954-1956 divided by the number of Registered automobiles, including taxis, but
excluding trucks, busses, and publicly-owned vehicles. Death statistics taken from the WORLD ,AU,[ANAc,
1958, p. 309, and the WORLD ALM,\NAC, 1957, p. 367. Automobile Registration statistics taken from the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF mE UNITED STATES, 1957, p. 554.
'WORLD ALMANAC. 1958, p. 752,
• Ratio of urban population to rural population. THE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT QF THE UNITED STATES, 1957,
p.22.

factors would also explain why Kansas' rate exceeds that of Nebraska. But the argument runs aground with respect to North
Dakota, where per capita income is a near equivalent of that in
South Dakota, but, despite a lower urban-rural ratio and a lower
rate of deaths per registered vehicle, the premium charged exceeds
that charged in South Dakota.
The mystery grows when one considers that the experience of
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters has led it to establish a rate of $26 for Sioux Falls, South Dakota, which had a 1950
population of 52,000, for insurance costing $10 more in Fargo,
North Dakota, which in 1950 had a smaller population of 38,000.
And, it should be noted that the difference in the rates applicable
in Nebraska and North Dakota, which have different rules of law
concerning contributory negligence, is less than the difference
between Nebraska and South Dakota, which have the same rule. 65
Thus chastened by an inability to supply a ready explanation
for the variations in rates, an approach may be made to the statistics
and rate data concerning those states believed to be desirable
subjects for the purpose of this investigation.
CLAIM FREQUENCY

The first two columns of Table II present statistics based upon
the claim experience of insurance carriers reporting to the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters in states with comparative
65 Thus, perhaps, lending support to the decision to forego detailed consideration of
the effect of the Nebraska and South Dakota statutes.

--.:r
0
00

TABLE II
CLAIM FREQUENCY AND Cos-rs

State

Alabama ...................

Arkansas* •.••..••..••.•....

Florida ...•................

Georgia* .•......•••..••.•••.

Illinois .....................

Iowa .......................
Louisiana ••................
Michigan ...................
Minnesota ..................

1954-19561
Bodily
Injury
Claim
Frequency

rr)
It!
1)

4)

7B)

M ississiPPi* .. ..............

6)
SC)

Missouri. ...•..............
North Carolina .............
Oklahoma ..................
South Carolina ..............
Tennessee ..................

2)
10)
SD)
SE)

Wisconsin* • •••••.....•••.•.

~l

1954-1956 2
Property
Damage
Claim
Frequency

r)

1954-1956•
Deaths
Per
Reg. Auto

2)

75
78
76
76
102

3.1'1
3.29
2.32
3.24
2.24

26
20
21
19

!If'
13)

94
86
108
90
65

1.98
2.95
2.04
1.67
3.45

34
17
19
19
23
27

3)
12~
11
14
SB)
4)

100
68
71
60
94
99

2.70
2.86
2.45
3.14
2.84
2.40

18
19
20
19
39

8)
9Al
9B

15

* Italicized name Indicates state has a comparative negligence rule,

1954-1956•
Bodily
Injury
Claims
Per Death

1954-1956'
Property
Damage
Claims
Per Death

5.79
5.78
8.62
5.86
17.41

24.12
23.71
8) 32.76
14) 23.46
4) 45.54

!itl
7)
13)
1)

7 .58
8,81
9.80
12.57
16) 5.51

11r
I

2) 12.59
12) 5.94
9)
7 .76
11) 6.05
8)
8.10
4) 11.25

!m

47.47
29.15
52.94
53.89
t6) 18.84

!Ii

6)
12}
10
15
~l

37 .04
23.78
28.98
19.11
33.10
41.25

1950 5
Urban-Rural
Population
Ratio

!rn
3)
10)
1)

.78
.49
1.90
.83
3.46

!~I

r6)

. 91
1.21
2.41
1.20
.39

4)
14)
8)
13~
11
5)

1.60
.51
1.04
.58
.79
1.37

1954-1956•
Average
Bodily
Injury
Claim Cost

1954-19561
Average
Property
Damage
Claim Cost

1954-19568
Total
Pure
Premium

2)
15)
8)

$765.
755.
906.
738.
803.

$129.
135.
134.
138,
144,

rl'"·"

1m
N

754 •
745.
653.
900.
939.

!m
7)
14)

il

828.
744.
882.
832.
901.
800.

!Ir
~l

r)

13)
3)

12l
10

ll

14)

12
7)
13)
1)

24.74
28.47
24.64
45 .87

108.
137.
131.
118.
139.

('

21.27
31.25
26.95
29.15
26.65

127.
130.
133.
162,
131.
109,

2)

40.55
21.59
15l 25.97
10
11 25.49
32.71
1l 32.73

1 Number of claims per 1000 automobiles insured-National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
• Number of claims per 1000 automobiles insured-National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
• Based upon deaths by place of accident-WORLD ALMANAC, 1958, p. 309; WORLD ALMANAC, 1957, p, 367; and registrations of private and commercial privately-owned automobiles
including taxis, but excluding trucks, busses, and publicly-owned vehicles-STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1957, p, 554,
'For an explanation of the derivation of these ratios, see pp, 709-710 infra.
• STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1957, p, 22.
• Average amount of losses per claim incurred with losses on a basic limits basis: Portions of losses in excess of $5,000 per claim and $10,000 per accident for bodily Injury excluded-National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.
T Amount of losses In excess of $5,000 for property damage excluded-National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
s Average amount of losses per insured car on basic limits basis-National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.

....C)~
....::i::

~

~

~

i
~

,.....,

~
t.n
00

1960]

AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE

709

negligence rules and their neighboring states. The states involved
with comparative negligence rules are Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and Wisconsin. Texas, though sharing a short common
border with Arkansas has been omitted from the list, not in recognition of claims of sovereignty, but because its large size includes so
much territory far away from and unlike Arkansas, with which it
would otherwise be compared. In the first column of Table II
the frequency of claims for personal injury per thousand automobiles insured is set out. In the second column, the frequency of
claims for property damage per thousand automobiles insured is
set out. In parentheses next to each frequency figure the relative
rank of the state in claim frequency is set out.
Analysis of these statistics leads to no conclusion, unless it is
that an effect of comparative negligence is not observable. Wisconsin, a comparative negligence state, does have a high bodily injury
claim frequency which places it third in that list, and a high
property damage claim frequency, which places it fourth in that
list. However, Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi, other comparative negligence states, share a common frequency with Oklahoma and South Carolina, being tied for ranking of eighth in a
field limited to eleven because of the number of instances in which
states have the same frequency. With respect to property damage
claim frequency, Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi rank eighth,
ninth, and thirteenth, respectively, in a field enlarged to fourteen
by fewer identical rates.
This great divergence in claim frequency between Wisconsin
and the other comparative negligence states immediately suggests
that analysis should proceed along more refined lines, with an
attempt made to make adjustments for the difference in safety
conditions and for what appears to be a difference between northern and southern states.
As mentioned above, the best indicator of safety conditions is
that found in the reported death statistics of the various states. 66
In the attempt to make an allowance for variation in safety
conditions, the statistics of the number of deaths per thousand
registered automobiles have been set out in third column of
Table II. If the claim frequencies of either column one or column
two are divided by the death frequency statistics of column three,
66

Pp. 698-699 supra.
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the result is a statistic indicating the frequency of that type of
claim per death. Thus,
Claims
1,000 Insured Autos

.

Claims
~Inmrred~

X

Deaths
1,000 Registered Autos
~

RegffltePed A-mes
Deaths

Claims
Deaths.

Taking deaths as the most satisfactory, though not the most
accurate, indicator of safety conditions, this ratio of claims per
death may be considered instead a ratio of claims per accident,
and consequently an index of the claim propensity of residents
of the various states.
Of course, even this simple calculation is based upon assumptions which are not true. The ratio of accidents to deaths is not
constant throughout the nation, but as has already been pointed
out there are fewer accidents per death in rural areas where the
higher speed of the vehicles involved results in a higher proportion
of fatalities in the accidents which do occur. The calculation also
assumes what undoubtedly is not true, that there is a constant
proportion of insured automobiles in the total of registered automobiles in the various states. Also assumed, but undoubtedly
not the fact, is that ratio of privately-owned automobiles to other
vehicles is constant throughout the states, and that privately-owned
automobiles are involved in the same proportion of fatal accidents
in all the states. Nevertheless, this rough adjustment for the
variation in safety conditions would appear to provide a more
reliable and accurate index of the claim propensities of residents
of various states than is found in the original data on the frequency
of claims per insured vehicle. These adjusted statistics of claim
frequency are set out in columns four and five of Table II, with
the relative rank of the state set out in parentheses next thereto.
Upon this basis Wisconsin drops in rank to fourth in the frequency of bodily injury claims and fifth in the frequency of property damage claims in a field of sixteen states. Mississippi drops
to last place with respect to both types of claims; Arkansas takes
fifteenth place in bodily injury claim frequency and thirteenth
in property damage claim frequency; Georgia takes thirteenth
place in bodily injury claim frequency and fourteenth in property
damage claim frequency. Again no conclusion can be drawn,
unless it is that the effect of comparative negligence does not appear after correction for differences in safety conditions.
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The divergence between northern and southern states is broadened, however, by the correction made for variations in safety
conditions. Many economic and social differences exist between
northern and southern states which might account for this difference in claim consciousness of their residents. For example, it is
possible that southern Negroes may forego pressing claims against
white persons which they would press in a northern state. Another
factor may be differences in the distribution of population between
urban areas and rural areas. Persons living in urbanized areas
might be expected to be more claim conscious than those living
in rural areas, because of the combination of the sophistication
resulting from newspaper publicity given litigation in larger cities
and the hardening to life that may still be the product of the less
comfortably developed rural areas:
An opportunity to test the effectiveness of this factor is provided
by the statistics of the ratio of urban population to rural population found in column six of Table II. And, when the relative
ranking of states in urban-rural ratio is compared with the relative
ranking in frequencies of claims per death (or accident) a sufficient
correlation is found to support the belief that this factor does
affect claim consciousness. Thus four of the sixteen states have
the same ranking with respect to bodily injury claim consciousness
as they have with respect to the urban-rural population ratio. Only
two of the states, Florida and Minnesota, have changed their
relative ranking in such a comparison by as much as four places;
three states, Georgia, Michigan, and Tennessee, changed their
relative ranking by three places, and the remaining eight are
within one or two places in rank on both lists. Turning to the
correlation between property damage claim frequency per death
(or accident) and urban-rural ratio, one notes that it is not as
close. Three states do have exactly the same ranking in each list,
but two states, Iowa and Minnesota, have a claim frequency rank
six places higher than their ranking in the urban-rural ratio list;
Florida has a claim frequency rank five places below its urbanrural ratio rank; and Georgia and Tennessee have moved four
places from their urban-rural ratio rank. Nevertheless, the correlation in ranking indicates the presence of an operative relationship between urban-rural distribution of population and claim
consciousness.
Table III presents a regional comparison of the claim frequency
statistics developed in Table II. Once again it may be noted that
there appears to be no relationship between claim frequency and
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TABLE III
REGIONAL COMPARISONS OF CLAIM FREQUENCY AND COSTS

1954-1956

1954-1956

Bodily
Injury
Claims
Per Death

Property
Damage
Claims
Per Death

(5)

5.78
8.81
5.51
12.59
7 .76
8.10

~5)
3)
(6~

1954-1956

1954-1956

Average
Bodily
Injury
Claim Cost

Average
Property
Damage
Claim Cost

(5)
(6~

(4)
(2)

(2)

23.71
29.15
18.84
37 .04
28.98
33.10

(5~
(3
(2)
(4)
(6)
(1)

23.46
24.12
32.76
23.78
19.11
33.10

(6~

(3)
(2)

5.86
5.79
8.62
5.94
6.05
8.10

{!~

MississiPPi- •.•.•.•••.
Alabama ........... (3
(51
Arkansas .........•. (4
Louisiana ..........
Tennessee ....•.•...

5.51
5.79
5.78
8.81
8.10

(5)
(3~

18.84
24.12
23.71
29.15
33.10

m
(5~
(2

939.
765.
755.
745.
901.

Wisconsin ............ (3~
Illinois ......•..•... (1

11.25
17.41
7.58
9.80
12.57

(5)
(4)
~3)

41.25
45.54
47 .47
52.94
53.89

~J~
~1~1)

800.
803.
754.
653.
900.

State

Arkansas .•••••••.•.••
Louisiana ..........
M!5sissiJ!1>i. ........
M1ssoun ...........
Oklahoma ..........
Tennessee ....•.....

?)

Georgia •••••..•.....•
Alabama ...........
Florida .............
North Carolina .....
South Carolina ......
Tennessee .•.....•..

(5)
(6)

6)
(1)
(4)
(3)

m
~h

Iowa ..............

Michigan .••....•... (5l
Minnesota ......•...

~i

(1
(4)

~i~
ci~

(1

~4)
3)
(2)

$755.
745.
939.
828.
882.
901.

(3)
(2)

738.
765.
906.
744.
832.
901.

(6
(ll
(3
(5)
(2~
(6

tf~
t

(4)
(1)

3)

(~~

(4~
g
(2)
(3)

$135.
137.
139.
127.
133.
131.

1954-1956

Total
Pure
Premium

(6) $24.74
31.25
26.65
40.55
(5) 25.97
(2) 32.71

ti~

138.
129.
134.
130.
162.
131.

r

24.64
23.06
28.47
21.59
25.49
32.71

139.
129.
135.
137.
131.

(~~

26.65
23.06
24.74
31.25
32.71

109.
144.
108.
131.
118.

(4)

2)
6)
3)
(1)

fa)

(1)

r
5)

~~

32.73
45.87
21.27
26.95
29.15

1950

UrbanRural
Population
Ratio
(5)

r
6)
1)
(3~
(4

r)

4)

jj

1~~

ii

!il
4)

.49
1.21
.39
1.60
1.04
.79
.83
.78
1.90
.51
.58
.79
.39
.78
.49
1.21
.79
1.37
3.46
.91
2.41
1.20

comparative negligence, unless it is the unlikely one that comparative negligence discourages claims. Instead, there does appear the
same rather positive correlation of claim frequency and urban-rural
population except in the case of the Georgia grouping of states.
In that grouping it may be noted that, except for Florida, there
is very little difference in the urban-rural population ratio so
that slight variations in that factor might not have an observable
effect.
Explanations of the difference in the correlation of bodily claim
frequency and property damage claim frequency statistics and
the urban-rural population ratio might be advanced. 67 But the
important thing for present purposes is not whether each state has
received an exactly correct rating in the list of claim frequency
statistics. It is instead that, after an adjustment for the differences
in safety conditions, the statistics show a relationship between the
61 The claim frequency statistics used here have been developed from the number
of traffic deaths which occurred in each state during the years 1954 through 1956. Almost
one half of the traffic deaths occurring in urban areas involve collisions with pedestrians,
whereas only eleven percent of the rural accidents involve collisions with pedestrians.
NATIONAL SAFETY CoUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS-1957, 48. Collisions with pedestrians are
extremely unlikely to produce property damage claims, whereas other accidents, causing
deaths, such as collisions of motor vehicles, collisions with fixed objects, trains, animals,
and even running off the road, are likely to create property damage claims. Accordingly,
the use of the death statistics in developing a claims ratio probably has a greater accuracy
with respect to rural accidents than it does with urban accidents.
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degree of urbanization and claim consciousness but fail to show
any relationship between comparative negligence and claim consciousness.
·
This, of course, does not mean that there is no relationship
between comparative negligence and claim consciousness. It means
only that the relationship cannot be detected with the statistical
techniques here used. Nor is any information obtained to answer
the important question of how many claims filed with companies
reach the state of litigation. The analysis does indicate, however,
that the influence of comparative negligence on claims consciousness is not as great as the effect of a higher degree of urbanization,
which can be detected in the statistics.

Insurance Costs
Claim frequency, with which we have thus far been concerned,
depends principally upon the accident rate, the types of accidents
which occur, and the claims consciousness of the community. In
turn, claim frequency is only one of the factors which determines
the ultimate level of liability insurance premiums. A more prosperous economy can afford expensive safety features in highway
construction, thus reducing accidents. On the other hand, the
economic level of the community will have an effect in terms of
the amount which must be paid to compensate for the loss of
wages, salaries, or other income caused by injuries. The economic
level of the community will also affect the community judgment
expressed in the jury verdict (or the estimate of the jury verdict
reflected in a compromise settlement) of the value to be placed
upon pain and suffering and physical disfigurement. The extent
to which the law permits, or community sentiment accords with,
the award of punitive damages in service of the admonitory function of tort law is probably a factor affecting rates. Other social
factors may affect community sympathy for an injured party and
the community opinion of what injuries should be considered
compensable and which injuries must be accepted with resignation
in the same way that beauty, brains, and wealthy ancestors, or
the lack thereof, must be accepted. And, while instructions to
the jury may correct some misapprehensions of jurors about what
matters are compensable and which are not, their latitude in determining the value to be placed on such intangibles will produce
variation with respect not only to judgments entered on verdicts
but with the negotiated settlements.
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Obviously many of these factors cannot be reduced to measurable quanta which can be the basis of comparison between states.
For others some statistical data may exist. But the interaction of
all the factors would seem to be too complicated to allow the use
of a formula for accurate prediction of the rate level. To the
extent that the social intangibles are a constant within a region
of this country, comparisons of one state with its adjacent neighbors
may be made without distortion. Tables IV-A, IV-B, IV-C, and
IV-D present such comparisons of four comparative negligence
states with their neighbors, with the various statistics set in columns
depending upon whether they are higher, lower, or the same as
that of the comparative negligence state.
TABLE IV
A.

ARKANSAS

Remainder of Stale Comparison
Arkansas Figures: $38.0S-#7.5-%6.9-&1.9-"'777-§25.08-@28.6-Il071-D/R3.2!1--U/R.49.
Higher
Lower
Neighboring State Rate Is:
Same
Louisiana .•..•• $47.78-#7.6-%7.5-&3.0--*798§36.99-11344-U/Rl.21 .............•. @26.9-D/R2.95 .............. .
Mississippi. .... $39.00--%8.1-"'968-§27.20--@29.6D/R3.45 ......................•...... #6.3-I957-U/R.39 ••••.....•••
Missouri ....•.. $57 .80--#7. 7-&2.8-"'1030--§40.09@71.1-Il 786-U/Rl.60 ........•...... %6.2-D/R2.70 •...••.......•.
Oklahoma ...•.. $38.66-*837-11499-U/Rl.04 .......... . j6.1-%6.2-&1.S-§24.08@27 .7-D/R2.45 •.••••..•....
Tennessee...... $39.7!1--j8.2-%8.0-&2.0--"'975§30.90--I1264-U/R.79 • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . @23.6-D/R2.84 •••..•.•....•..

B.

&1.9

GEORGIA

Remainder of State Comparison
Georgia Figures: $37.00-j6.5-%8.2-&1.9-*766-§24.82-@23.7-I1338-D/R3.24-U/R.83.
Neighboring State Rate Is:
Higher
Lower
Same
Alabama.. • • . • $37.so--;6.8-%8.6-*776-@25.1 &1.8-§24.05-I1185-D/R3.11-U/R.78
Florida....... *860--@37.1-11666-U/Rl.90 ...• $32.63-#6.4-%6.6-&1.8-§24.48D/R2.32 ........................... .
North Carolina .•••.•••.••.•••••••••.•..•..•.•.. $30.50-j6.4-%7.7-*759-§23.66@21.5-11254-D/R2.86-U/R.51 .....
South Carolina %9.4-*813-§25.34 ......•.....•. $34.60--#5.5-@17.6-I1117D/R3.14-U/R.58 .................. .
Tennessee... • . $39. 79-#8.2-&2.0--*975-§30.90 %S.0--@23.6-I1264-D/R2.84-U/R.79

C.

&1.9
&1.9

MISSISSIPPI

Remainder of State ComParison
Mississippi Figures: $39.00--/6.3-%8.1-&1.9-"'96S-§27.20--@29.6-I957-D/R3.45-U/R.39.
Higher
Lower
Same
Neighboring State Rate Is:
Alabama...... i6.8-%8.6-I1185-U/R.78 .••... $37.30-&1.8-*776-§24.05-@25.1D/R3.11. ......•....................
Arkansas...... #7.5-11071-U/R.49 •••........•. $38.08-%6.9-*777-§25.08-@28.6D/R3.29 .•..•...............•.•.....
Louisiana..... $47.78-#7.6-&3.0--§36.9911344-U/Rl.21 •.............. %7.~-*798-@26.9-D/R2.95 .....•....
Tennessee..... $39.79-#8.2-&2.0-*975§30.90--11264-U/R.79......... %8.0--@23.6-D/R2.84 ............... .

&1.9
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D. WISCONSIN

Remainder of Stale Comparison
Wisconsin Figures: $40.56-#7.4-% 7.o-&2.3~11-§29.93-@52.6-11760-D/R2.40-U/Rl.37.
Neighboring State Rate Is:
Higher
Lower
Same
$34.38-%6.8-&2.1-*869D/R2.24 •.•..•••..•.........•...
Iowa •••.••.•. 17.8 ............................... . $28.31-%5.5-&1.4-*856--§21.55@45.4-11580-D/Rl.98-U/R.91.
Michigan..... #9.8-%7.l-I2132-U/R2.41 ...••.•.• $37.18-&2.0-*697-§27.26@36.0-D/R2.04 ••..........•....
Minnesota •••• >t972-@88.7 ••••••.•••..•.•...••.... $37.00-#7.2-%4.8--&1.8-§26.2711675-D/Rl.67-U/Rl.20 •••..•..
Illinois.... . . • • #8.4-§30.35-@89.8-l2243-U/R3.46

Code:
$-Remainder of State Premium, adjusted to July 1, 1958.
#-1955-1957 Property Damage Claim Frequency. Letter of National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters
Sept. 10, 1959.
,
%-1955 Mileage Death Rate. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS-1957, 56.
&-1955-1957 Bodily Injury Claim Frequency. Letter of National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
Sept. 10, 1959.
*--1955-1957 Bodily Injury Average Claim Cost. Letter of National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters,
Sept. 10, 1959.
§-1955-1957 Total Pure Premium. Letter of National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, Sept. 10, 1959.
@-Percentage of Policies Providing Bodily Injury Liability Coverage over $10,000/$20,000. Letter of
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, Nov. 7, 1958.
I-Annual Per Capita Income (1955). WORLD AL'dANAC, 1958, p. 752.
D/R-Deaths Per Registered Auto. See Table II.
U/R-Urban-Rural Population Ratio. See Table I!.

The premium rate set out in the table is the combined rate
for the basic Class I-A bodily injury and property damage coverage set by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters. 68 The
rates are for the catch-all territories denominated "remainder of
state." 69 They have been adjusted to a hypothetical rate effective
as of July 1, 1958, to avoid the differentials that would otherwise
be present in rates which became effective upon widely separated
dates. The statistics on claim frequency, average claim cost, and
pure premium are, however, based upon data covering all classes
of insurance for the remainder of state territories, for the simple
68 This class consists of privately-owned automobiles, driven for pleasure, and not
used for transportation to or from work, for which there is neither a male owner nor
driver under the age of 25. The limits of coverage are, for bodily injury, not in excess
of $5,000 to any individual nor more than $10,000 for any one accident, and, for property
damage, not in excess of $5,000 for any accident.
69 As mentioned above, these territories generally include rural and small city areas
which do not have sufficiently distinctive characteristics to merit treatment as separate
territories. They probably present the best opportunity for comparison because differences
in the accident rate caused by density of population, volume of traffic, and varying degrees
of municipal law enforcement, as well as the amount of claims consciousness created by
particular news editorial policies, are minimized.
In the cases of Mississippi and Oklahoma the bureau now •has no remainder of state
territory. For those states the rates used are rates applicable in territories covering large
rural areas such as those usually classified as remainder of state. Of course, a search for
correlation between "remainder of state" rates and other statistics which are based upon
the entire experience of the state proceeds upon the assumption that the insurance experience in these specially defined areas may properly be compared with other experience
data accumulated on a statewide basis. Undoubtedly some distortion results.
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reason that this is the only form in which it was available. The
sources for other data are set out in the tables, which include some
of the data from Table II.
The first impression produced by examination of the tables is
that variations in level of liability insurance premiums are accompanied by changes in the cluster of variable factors which
might be expected to influence the rates, but no fixed relationship
between rates and any one of the factors can be observed. Thus,
there is a correlation between higher insurance rates and a higher
mileage death rate in only ten of the eighteen comparisons. The
correlation between higher insurance rates and the statewide
death rate per registered automobile is the same, with an affirmative relation existing in ten of the eighteen comparisons. On the
other hand, there is a substantial correlation between the frequency
of claims per insured vehicle and the level of rates, there being
twelve instances in the eighteen comparisons in which a higher
frequency for bodily injury claims is accompanied by higher
premium rates, and eleven instances of such correlation with respect to property damage claim frequency. The total pure premium
figures, which represent the average amount of losses per insured
car, have the highest correlation with insurance premium levels,
there being an affirmative relationship in fourteen of the eighteen
comparisons. The correlation between per capita income and
insurance premiums is weaker, there being an affirmative correlation in only ten of the eighteen comparisons, suggesting the possibility that the higher economic losses in states with high per
capita income is partially offset by the improvement in safety
conditions which a higher economic level is capable of creating.
The same weak correlation exists with respect to the urban-rural
population ratio but this is not so puzzling since the rates compared are for the territories "remainder of state," which generally
are rural or less developed parts of the state and hence less affected
by the overall degree of urbanization.
If a comparison of the rates alone is made, as presented in
Table V, it will be noticed that there is an equal division of instances in which the rates applicable in states with one rule exceed
the rates applicable in states with another rule. In eight instances
the rate of a state with a comparative negligence rule is higher
than the rate of a neighboring state with a contributory negligence
rule and in eight instances the rate of the state with a comparative
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TABLE V
PREMIUM RATES IN COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATES ARE:

State

Higher

Arkansas

M~l~~:i::::::::::::::: ::::::::::
Oklahoma ••••.••••••..•.•........•.

Tennessee .••..•.....•.•.....•.•..•.

Lower

State

Higher

Lower

$ 9.70

Mississippi
Alabama................

$ 1. 70

..•.••....

Wisconsin
Illinois ••.•••••.••.••••.
Iowa .••.....•.•....•.•.
Michigan .•....•.••••.•.
Minnesota .••.••...•.•••.

6.18
12.25
3.38
3.56

. 92
19.72
.58
1.71

Georgia
Alabama...........................
.30
Florida.................. $ 4.37 ....•••••.
North Carolina...........
6.50 ....•.•...
South Carolina............
2 .40 ..•.......
Tennessee.... . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . . . • . .
2. 79

tti:~~a·:.:
'.: '.::::::::: ..... :~: .. ·.. ss:•7978 ..
Tennessee............... . . . . . . . . . .

AVERAGE DIFFERENCE

(Eliminating ArkansasMississippi Comparison) ..

5.04

s.ss

negligence rule is lower.70 The average amount of the excess in
those comparisons in which the rates for comparative negligence
states exceed the average rate for contributory negligence states
is $5.04, which is 13.3 percent of the average rate for those twelve
states with contributory negligence rules in the group compared.
The average amount of the difference in those comparisons in
which the rates for comparative negligence states are lower is $5.55,
which is 14.6 percent of the average rate in the states with contributory negligence rules. 71 It should also be noted that four
of the comparisons in which rates in comparative negligence states
are higher involve Wisconsin, and that four of the comparisons in
which rates of comparative negligence states are lower involve
Arkansas.
This near equality of comparison of rates gives a superficial
basis for a conclusion that comparative negligence has had no
effect upon the insurance premium rates. However, this absolute
equality of comparison in a field so small may be attributed to
chance, such as peculiar and particular conditions prevailing in
either Wisconsin or Arkansas, and therefore has little statistical
significance. It may be noted, however, by reference to Tables
IV-A,B,C, and D, that in every case in which the comparative
negligence state had a higher premium rate than its neighbors,
it also had a higher rate of deaths per registered vehicle, or a higher
70 The number of possible comparisons of states on this basis is smaller than was
possible for other statistical measures, because Arkansas and Mississippi, which both have
comparative negligence rules, have common borders, but cannot be so compared.
71 This average difference has been distorted by the great difference between the rate
applicable in Arkansas and the rate applicable in Missouri.
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accident rate.72 And, two of the comparisons in which the comparative negligence state rates are substantially lower involve comparisons of Arkansas with its wealthier and more highly urbanized
neighbors, Missouri and Louisiana. The other instance in which
the comparative negligence state rate is substantially lower involves a comparison of Mississippi with the wealthier and more
highly urbanized state of Louisiana.
The result of this rather tedious analysis of rates and other
statistics is that nothing conclusive appears. While there is no
preponderance of higher rates in states with comparative negligence rates, the field is not large enough to permit a statement
that there is no effect. But if there is any effect, it certainly is
not strong enough to be noted in the sixteen comparisons made.

The Arkansas Experience
As mentioned above, Arkansas adopted the principle of comparative negligence in June 1955. In 1957 the formulation of
the principle was changed from the "pure" comparative negligence
standard of 1955 to the more limited form in which recovery is
allowed only where plaintiff's negligence is less than that of the
defendant. Despite this change, the state has, for more than four
years, been governed by a standard allowing recovery by one whose
negligence was a contributing cause of his injuries. Accordingly,
it furnishes working laboratory experiment on the effect of comparative negligence upon liability insurance premiums. If comparative negligence does produce increased premium rates for
liability insurance one would expect the rate of increase of rates
in Arkansas to be greater than that which has occurred in neighboring states.
Some obs.tacles exist to the making of such a comparison.
Changes in insurance rates become effective in different states
with varying frequencies and upon different dates. For example,
the most recent of four increases in Class I-A rates for Arkansas
since February 1955 became effective on December 10, 1958,
whereas the most recent increase in the comparable rates in Oklahoma since November 1955 became effective in October 1957.
Moreover, since the initial level of the rates differed in the two
states, a dollar and cents increase comparison would be misleading
72 Thus supporting the proposition that comparative negligence causes carelessness
and increases accidents - and at the same time furnishing an example of how statistical
support may be found for almost any preconceived notion.
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as to the rate of increase. An adjustment may be made, however,
for both these factors by converting the increase between the 1955
rate and the present rate into a percentage increase for the period,
and then reducing that increase to a monthly rate of increase which
is subject to comparison.
Another difficulty is caused by the number of rate territories
and territorial groupings in the various states. Because each state
has several territories, there are different and varying monthly
rates of increase within each state. Moreover, during the fouryear period territorial groupings have been broken up, and in
1959 several rate structures existed in some states for an area
formerly covered by one rate structure. To some extent it appears
that these new territorial groupings have been established for
areas in which the greatest change in loss experience has occurred
and that the highest monthly rate of change is associated with
these new territories. Accordingly, care must be taken to avoid
distortion from these figures.
Use of percentage increases by territorial groupings may be
misleading as to the extent to which rates have increased in the
state as a whole. For example, two states may each have four
territorial groupings. In State A, the percentage increases in the
four territories may have been 10%, 15%, 15%, and 20%, respectively. In State B, the rates of increase during the same period
might have been 20%, 5%, 10%, and 10%, respectively. One
who took an unweighted average of the percentage increases would
conclude that there had been a greater increase in State A than
in State B. However, if half of the insured vehicles in each state
are located in the first territorial grouping and only one tenth of
the insured vehicles are located in the fourth grouping, the increase has been greater in State B than in State A. In the absence
of some statistical adjustment or weighting of averages (and there
is none in the computations which follow) this possibility of inaccuracy inheres in the analysis.
The system used by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters divides Arkansas into four territories and three territorial
groupings. Territory one consists of all Pulaski County, in which
the city of Little Rock is located. Territory two covers the Fort
Smith area on the border of Arkansas and Oklahoma. Territory
three consists of all of certain northeastern counties bordering on
Tennessee and hence close to Memphis. Territory four is the
remainder of state territory. For purposes of rate structure at the
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TABLE VI

AVERAGE MONTHLY PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN CLASS 1-A COMBINED BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY
DAMAGE PREMIUM RATES IN ARKANSAS AND SURROUNDING STATES, 1955-1959

Territories
State

1

2

3

4

5

6

Arkansas ••••••••••••
.8260% 1.9782% .8260%
Missouri ••••••••.••. 1.5227
1.4318
.0000 ·i:221:i¾ ·i:5909% ·i:s909%
Oklahoma ••••••••••• 1.5652
.9565
1.3913
1. 7826
1.3913
1.3913
.3939
Louisiana ••••••.••.•
1.6363 -.0909
.7878
1.3030
.2727
Mississippi. ••••••••. 1.0540
.1351
.7027
.7027
1.3513
Tennessee ••.•••••••.
.5744
.1489
.4468 · ·:s123··
.4255
.1063

7

8

·2:3409% ·2:3809%
.2142

2.5000

··:«tSs·· ·········
·········

present time, the bureau groups territory three and territory four
together. The states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Tennessee, which surround Arkansas, now have thirtyfour different territorial groupings.
A tabulation of the monthly percentage increases in the Class
I-A liability insurance rates set by the bureau for each of these
territorial groupings is presented in Table VI. The same data are
recast in graphic form for visual presentation in Table VIL The
unweighted average of the monthly percentage increase for all
of the 37 territorial groupings is 1.03 percent73 whereas the monthly percentage increase in two of the Arkansas territorial groupings
was .83 percent and for the other, the Fort Smith territory, the
monthly percentage increase was 1.98 percent. The median of
the monthly percentage increases, which is less affected by the
extremely high percentage increases applicable to certain new
territorial groupings,74 is .96 percent.
Certainly in these statistics there rests no proof that comparative negligence results in higher liability insurance premium
rates. Two of the territorial groupings, which cover most of the
states and most of the insured vehicles in Arkansas, have a rate
of increase below both the average and the median of the rate of
increase which occurred in the other territorial groupings. One,
the Fort Smith territory, located on the Oklahoma boundary,
is very substantially above both the average and the median. For
present purposes this is illuminating, since the residents of Fort
Smith probably do a substantial amount of driving in Oklahoma
and accordingly . have accidents where the contributory negli73 If the percentage increases in the seven territorial groupings in Texas are utilized
in making the comparisons the unweighted average monthly percentage incri:ase becomes
instead .91%.
74 If the percentage increases in the seven territorial groupings in Texas are utilized
in making the comparisons the median increase drops to .79%.
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TABLE VII
AVERAGE MONTHLY INCREASE IN CLASS 1-A COMBINED BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE
PREMIUM RATES FOR ARKANSAS AND SURROUNDING STATES DURING 1955-1959
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Groups -,1% 0%

,1% ,2% ,3% ,4% ,5% ,6% ,7% ,8% ,9% 1.0% 1.1% 1.2% 1,3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.9% 2,0% 2.1% 2,2% 2.3% 2,4% 2.5%
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gence rule still prevails. Presence of this bar to recovery, which
would be recognized in Arkansas under the usual rule applicable
to such a conflict of laws situation,75 would be expected to mitigate
the increases in rates attributable to the change in Arkansas law
if the legal effect given contributory negligence is a significant
factor in this respect. Instead, the substantial increase in the
Fort Smith rates appears to be caused by setting the dollar amount
of those rates on a par with the other territorial groupings.
Of course, these statistics do not prove that comparative negligence does not affect the level of liability insurance premium
rates.76 Without enactment of the comparative negligence statutes Arkansas might have had a lower rate of increase, comparable, for, example, with that of Tennessee. However, it is possible
to say once again that if comparative negligence does affect insurance rates, its effect is not great enough to be observable in
the complex of forces acting on the rate level. It is not, for example, anywhere near as strong as whatever peculiar local developments led to very high increase rates in new territorial
groupings in Louisiana and Missouri.

Geographical Distribution of Rate Territories
Under the usual conflicts rule the law of the place of the tort
determines the applicability of the defense of contributory negligence.77 According to available statistics nonresident drivers are
involved in a substantial number of accidents.78 If the presence
75 Powell Bros. Truck Lines v. Barnett, 194 Ark. 769, 109 S.W. (2d) 673 (1937); Missouri
P.R. Co. v. Miller, 184 Ark. 61, 41 S.W. (2d) 971 (1931); St. Louis-S.F. R. Co. v. Rogers,
172 Ark. 508, 290 S.W. 74 (1927); St. Louis, I.M. and S. R. Co. v. McNamare, 91 Ark.
515, 122 s.w. 102 (1909); LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAws 222 {1959).
76 Cf. Professor Rosenberg's findings that the Arkansas statute did alter the value of
personal injury claims for the purposes of settlement, and increased the proportion of
verdicts won by plaintiffs, though it did not increase the size of verdicts. Rosenberg,
"Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A 'Before and After' Survey,'' 13 ARK. L. REv.
89 at 103-105 (1959).
77 CONFLICT OF LAWS RF.srATEMENT §385 (1934). The usual conflict rule is applied in
Arkansas, cases cited note 75 supra. Georgia, Craven v. Brighton Mills, 87 Ga. App. 126,
73 S.E. (2d) 248 (1952), and Mississippi, Tri-State Transit Co. v. Mondy, 194 Miss. 714,
12 S. (2d) 920 (1943); and apparently would be applied in Wisconsin. See Haumschild v.
Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. (2d) 130, 95 N.W. (2d) 814 (1959). But cf. Bourestom v.
Bourestom, 231 Wis. 666, 285 N.W. 426 (1939) (overruled on another issue in Haumschild
v. Continental Cas. Co., supra).
78 During 1956, 16% of all fatal accidents and 9% of all accidents involved drivers
who were not residents of the state in which the accident occurred. During the same
year, 35% of all fatal accidents and 27% of all accidents involved drivers residing more
than 25 miles from the place of the accident. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 1957, 53.
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or absence of a complete defense in contributory negligence is
a substantial factor in producing higher liability insurance rates
one would hypothesize that residents living near the borders of
states with comparative negligence rules would have a loss experience different from those living in the center of the state.
Thus, drivers in states with comparative negligence who live
near the borders of those states would have lower rates than otherwise comparable drivers in the center of those states. Likewise,
drivers in neighboring states with contributory negligence rules
who live near the border of a state with comparative negligence
would have higher rates than otherwise comparable drivers living at a distance from that border.
The rate data of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters unfortunately does not make it possible to make a general
test of this hypothesis. There is no general delineation of rate
territorial boundaries in either category of states which indicates concern on the part of insurance actuaries for the probability of travel in neighboring states. Of course, this indicates
more than lack of actuarial concern with comparative negligence;
it indicates lack of concern with all difference in rules of law and,
indeed, a lack of concern for a state-by-state consideration of
the many other variables affecting insurance rates. It is also
a reminder that the actuarial process by which rates are established
is not so precise and delicate as to reflect separately the influences
of the many factors thought to affect rate structures. Indeed, the
insurance principle, requiring a sharing of generalized risks, precludes an overly refined system which would subject small groups
or individuals to paying the costs of their particular experience.
There do exist, however, a few ,instances in which territorial
boundaries have been drawn so as to make it possible to test
this hypothesis. As previously mentioned, the Fort Smith territory in Arkansas is located on the border of Oklahoma. The bureau's class I-A liability rates for that territory were raised in
1956 to the same level as those for all other territories in Arkansas. Thus, proximity to Oklahoma and resultant driving under
its laws have not been reflected in reduced rates for this border
city.
Certain cities in Georgia, with comparable populations79 each
of which constitutes a separate territory for the purposes of ac70 In 1950 the population of the cities was as follows: Augusta - 71,508; Columbus 79,611; Macon -70,252. THE WoRLD ALMANAC 1958, 273.
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cumulation of loss experience, provide another opportunity for
a test. Augusta, Georgia is located on the border of South Carolina. Columbus, Georgia is located on the border of Alabama.
Macon, Georgia is located in the middle of the state. Contrary
to the hypothesis all three cities have the same bureau class I-A
liability rates. In neighboring Alabama, the bureau has established the same rate for Montgomery, located in the center of
the state, as that applicable to somewhat larger Mobile, which
is approximately 20 miles from the Mississippi border. Six counties in a territory of South Carolina are located on the border
of Georgia, yet they have the same rates as the remainder of the
state. One bureau territory in Mississippi consists of a long narrow string of counties running the length of the Mississippi River,
and hence a territorial grouping on the boundary with Arkansas
and Louisiana. It has the same rate structure as another territory
which covers most of the state.
In northern Wisconsin, LaCrosse, located on the border of
Minnesota, is classified with and has the same rates as the more
centrally located cities of Fond Du Lac, Green Bay, Madison, Oshkosh and Sheboygan. Beloit, located on the Illinois border, is
classified with the more centrally located cities of Appleton, Chippewa Falls, Eau Claire, Waukesha, and Wausau. On' the other
hand, the northern counties of Wisconsin which border on the
Upper Peninsula of Michigan have the lowest Class I-A rates in
the state, suggesting that here the contributory negligence rule
of Michigan has had an effect. This conclusion is dispelled when
one notes that the counties of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan
bordering on Wisconsin also have the lowest rates in Michigan,
suggesting that level of the rates in comparison with the other
portions of b,oth states is caused more by similar economic, climatic, and social conditions than by differences in the treatment
accorded contributory negligence. However, some factor dependent upon state boundaries, whether it is the regulation of
the insurance industry, the Wisconsin joinder rule 80 or some
so The Wisconsin courts will not permit direct action against an insurance company
on a policy with a "no action" clause (i.e., no action may be maintained against the
insurance company until liability of the insured has been established by judgment) valid
in the state in which it was issued. Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W. (2d) 611
(1950). See MacDonald, "Direct Action Against Liability Insurance Companies," 1957
WIS. L. REv. 612 at 616-617. Accordingly, even in an action brought in Wisconsin the
insurer of a Michigan resident could not be joined as a party defendant if the policy
contained such a clause, which is apparently valid in Michigan, but subject to waiver.
Cf. Kipkey v. Casualty Assn. of America, 255 Mich. 408, 238 N.W. 239 (1931); Barney v.
Preferred Automobile Ins. Exchange, 240 Mich. 199, 215 N.W. 372 (1927). On the other
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other legal factor is apparent in the difference between the $27
rate charged for the basic Class I-A coverage in the Michigan
counties and the $40 rate charged in neighboring Wisconsin
counties.
Once again analysis of the data does not permit an affirmative
statement that comparative negligence does or does not affect
liability insurance rate levels. This indefiniteness of the data
might be due to the fact that the proportion of accidents involving nonresident drivers, though ranging from 9 to 16 percent
on a statewide basis and undoubtedly higher near state boundaries, 81 is not sufficient to make the effect of comparative negligence apparent in loss experience. The general lack of concern
of the actuaries for proximity to state borders is consistent with
this conclusion. However, while the possibility remains of an
undetected effect of comparative negligence on the level of rates,
this analysis of geographical distribution of territories indicates
that its possible force is not sufficient to be observable.

Miscellaneous Indicators
Another indication of lack of concern on the part of insurance actuaries for the differences between comparative negligence
and contributory negligence rules may be found in the practice
used to determine the premium rate charged for coverage in
excess of the basic limits of $5,000 per person and $10,000 per
accident for bodily injury coverage and $5,000 for property damage. It is sometimes argued that comparative negligence would
encourage the filing of nuisance claims and would result in award
of reduced damages to plaintiffs totally at fault out of sympathy
for their handicapped condition. 82 Accordingly, one would expect the losses within the basic limits to be higher in states
with comparative negligence rules than it is in states following
the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar to rehand, it is clear that the insurance company could not be sued in a direct action in
Michigan, Lieberthal v. Glens Falls Indemnity Company, 316 Mich. 37, 24 N.W. (2d)
547 (1946). Accordingly, the difference in the results due to the rules relating to joinder
might be apparent in the rates, despite a substantial amount of travel across the border
by residents of both states.
81 Note 78 supra.
82 E.g., Benson, "Comparative

Negligence - Boon or Bane," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 204 at
207 (1956); Gilmore, "Comparative Negligence from a Viewpoint of Casualty Insurance,"
10 ARK. L. REv. 82 at 83 (1955); Lipscomb, "Comparative Negligence," 1951 INS. L.J. 667;
Powell, "Contributory Negligence: A Necessary Check on the American Jury," 43 A.B.A.J.
1005 at 1007 (1957).
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covery. Since the increase in premiums for extended coverage
is computed as a percentage of the basic $5,000/$10,000 coverage policy, one would expect different percentage factors to
be used in states with comparative negligence rules. However,
the same factors are used for all states to determine the premiums
for increased limits, with the exception of Louisiana and Oklahoma where somewhat higher factors are applicable.83
Another indication· that comparative negligence has not affected the proportionate distribution of small and large claims
may be found in the statistics of average claim costs presented in
Tables II and III, where no marked correlation between comparative_ negligence and ranking in size of average claim appears.
On the other hand, reference to Table IV-A, B, C, and D will
disclose that in only five comparisons between comparative negligence states and contributory negligence states did a higher proportion of the residents of states with contributory negligence
rules carry insurance with higher coverage limits than the residents of comparative negligence states. Or to put in the other
way, in eleven comparisons, a higher proportion of residents in
comparative negligence states carried insurance with higher coverage limits than did residents in neighboring states with contributory negligence. From this one might conclude that the residents of comparative negligence states have been made more protection minded, but their concern does not appear to be with the
smaller claims which comparative negligence is said to promote.
CONCLUSION

Certainly this analysis of insurance data and other statistical
information has produced no definite or precise measure of the
effect of comparative negligence on automobile liability insurance. The effect of some factors, such as safety conditions or the
death rate and the urban-rural population ratio can be detected.
Generally speaking, however, it must be said that no effect from
comparative negligence appears in the data. Teachers of tort
law who each year must instruct their first-year classes on the
effect of contributory negligence upon recoveries-and their classes consist of college-educated students who certainly possess a
sophistication much above that of the general public-may find
nothing surprising in the indications that comparative negligence has no effect upon the claims consciousness of the general
83 Letter

from the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, November 5, 1958.
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public. A total lack of effect would be consistent with the view
that despite the legal bar of contributory negligence, comparative
negligence is in fact practiced in all states, by insurance adjusters,84 defense and plaintiffs' attorneys, juries,85 and even judges.86
If this is true, one would expect no effect on the general level of
rates. Instead, in only a limited number of cases, in which juries
literally applied the contributory negligence bar or dealt freely
with one totally at fault in producing his injuries, would a different result occur with a different rule of law. The choice then
between the two rules would not be one involving a question of
84 One manual for casualty insurance adjusters contains the following advice:
"Since our first and most important defense is that of contributory negligence, I
think that this is the proper time to warn the new claims man that although he must
know the law as related to his work, he must be just as careful to avoid giving it too
much weight when it comes to settling claims. Take the law seriously, but don't become
wedded to it. As the new man gains in experience, he will learn much to his chagrin that
some juries do not give proper consideration to theoretically valid defenses.
" .•• Theoretically, the percentage of negligence with which the plaintiff can be
charged is immaterial in defeating his right of action, in cases where this defense is proper.
In other words, according to the law, even if his own contributory negligence was only
10 per cent of all the negligence in the accident, this would be sufficient to bar his
recovery. In practice, however, the theory is rarely applied so stringently." MAGARICK,
SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF CASUALTY CLAIMS 17-18 (1955). See also id. at 271-272; GORTON,
AUTOMOBILE CLAIM PRACTICE 92, 145 (1940). But cf. id. at 158-159.
85Benson, "Comparative Negligence-Boon or Bane," 26 INS. COUNSEL J. 204 at 205,
211 (1956); Bress, "Comparative Negligence: Let Us Hearken to the Call of Progress,"
43 A.B.A.J. 127 at 128 (1957); Harkavey, "Comparative Negligence -The Reflections of
a Skeptic," 43 A.B.A.J. 1115 at 1116-1117 (1957); Powell, "Contributory Negligence, A
Necessary Check on the American Jury," 43 A.B.A.J. 1005 at 1006 (1957); Tooze, "Contributary vs. Comparative Negligence-A Judge Expresses His Views," 12 NACCA L.J.
211 at 212 (1953); ULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 31-32 (1936).
86 For an example of judicial approval, or at least condonation, of compromise verdicts
limiting the damages awarded a plaintiff whose contributory negligence was believed by
the jury to be a cause of his injuries, even though the legal rule would require a complete
bar, see Karcesky v. Laria, 382 Pa. 227 at 234, 114 A. (2d) 150 (1955). The court there
said, "The doctrine of comparative negligence, or degrees of negligence, is not recognized
by the Courts of Pennsylvania, but as a practical matter they are frequently taken into
consideration by a jury. The net result, as every trial judge knows, is that in a large
majority of negligence cases where the evidence of negligence is not clear, or where the
question of contributory negligence is not free from doubt, the jury brings in a compromise verdict.
" •.. In the instant case twelve reasonable men could have serious doubt as to whether
Laria was negligent; and if Laria was negligent, whether the accident was caused by his
negligence or by the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs or partly by the negligence
of each of them. Under such circumstances, a jury usually does what this jury did,
namely render a compromise verdict which is much smaller in amount than they would
have awarded (a) if defendant's negligence was clear, and (b) if they were convinced
that plaintiffs were free from contributory negligence.
"Where the evidence of negligence or contributory negligence, or both is conflicting
or not free from doubt, a trial judge has the power to uphold the time-honored right
of a jury to render a compromise verdict, and to sustain a verdict which is substantial a capricious verdict or one against the weight of the evidence or against the law, can and
should always be corrected by the Court."
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substantially higher insurance rates for everyone, but a question
of the justness of results in a limited number of cases.
It is possible that comparative negligence has an effect upon
insurance rates, but that that effect cannot be detected with the
data on hand and the techniques used. Even if this is true, however, some measure of its force has been obtained. Adoption of
a comparative negligence rule, as shown by the Arkansas experience, would not have a catastrophic result upon the insurance
rate structure of any state. Indeed, it would not have as much
effect as rapid growth of population, increased urbanization, or
change to a traffic program with the effective safety record of
a neighboring state. Its effect, if any, would probably go undetected in the rates and statistics of the insurance industry.

